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Trust-based belief change
Emiliano Lorini1 and Guifei Jiang2 and Laurent Perrussel3
Abstract. We propose a modal logic that supports reasoning about
trust-based belief change. The term trust-based belief change refers
to belief change that depends on the degree of trust the receiver has
in the source of information.
1 Introduction
Trust in information sources plays a crucial role in many domains of
interaction between agents, in particular when information sources
are either human agents or software agents (e.g., banks, companies,
consultants, etc.), typical examples are in the field of e-commerce
or in the field of stock and bond market. In the latter case, an agent
may receive information from a given source about the evolution of
a stock’s price. In these situations, the agent’s trust in the source has
an influence on the dynamics of the belief about the evolution of the
stock’s price. The latter belief is fundamental for the agent to decide
whether to buy or sell stocks.
The aim of this paper is to improve understanding of the relation-
ship between belief and trust: we propose a logic for reasoning about
trust-based belief change, that is, belief change that depends on the
degree of trust the receiver has in the information source. We call this
logic DL-BT which stands for Dynamic Logic of graded Belief and
Trust. Using this logic, we stress out the interplay between trust and
belief change in a modular way. As opposed to numerous approaches
such as [4] where the interplay is predefined and thus specific, the
logic DL-BT allows to implement different trust-based belief change
policies.
On the technical level, the logic DL-BT consists of extending
Liau’s static modal logic of belief and trust [12] in three different
directions: (i) a generalization of Liau’s approach to graded trust, (ii)
its extension by modal operators of knowledge and by modal oper-
ators of graded belief based on Spohn’s theory of uncertainty [14],
and (iii) by a family of dynamic operators in the style of dynamic
epistemic logics (DEL) [16]. The latter allows for the representation
of the consequences of a trust-based belief change operation while
the second enables to handle iterated belief change.
Our contribution is twofold. First of all, our concept of trust-based
belief change does not presuppose that incoming information is nec-
essarily incorporated in the belief set of the agent. This is a key
difference with classical belief revision [1] whose primary princi-
ple of change (or success postulate) leads any agent to accept new
information and to revise her beliefs accordingly. This postulate has
been widely criticized in the literature and several approaches of non-
prioritized belief revision have been proposed [9]. Credibility-limited
revision approach [10, 5] assumes that revision will be successful
only if new information is credible, in the sense it does not conflict
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with the current beliefs of the agent. Differently from this approach,
our key criterion for acceptance of new information is not its credi-
bility but trust in the information source.
Secondly, our logic DL-BT provides a solution to the problem
of representing the author of a communicative act in the DEL-
framework. Indeed, existing dynamic epistemic logics [13, 3] do not
specify the author of the announcement, as they assume that the an-
nouncement is performed by some agent outside the system that is
not part of the logic’s object language.
The paper is organized as follows. We first present the syntax and
the semantics of the logic DL-BT and detail two trust-based belief
change policies: an additive policy and a compensatory policy. The
additive policy cumulates information received by different infor-
mation sources. In case different sources provide conflicting infor-
mation, the compensatory policy balances them depending on how
much they are trustworthy. We then provide a sound and complete
axiomatization for the variant of DL-BT implementing these two
policies.
2 Dynamic logic of graded belief and trust
In the next two sections we present the syntax and semantics of the
logic DL-BT that combines modal operators of knowledge, graded
belief and trust with dynamic operators of trust-based belief change.
2.1 Syntax of DL-BT
Let Atm = {p, q, . . .} be a countable set of propositional atoms and
let Agt = {i, j, . . .} be a finite set of agents. Moreover, let Num =
{0, . . . ,max} be a finite set of natural numbers with max ∈ N \ {0}
which represents the scale for trust and belief degrees. For instance,
the set Num = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} can be interpreted as a qualitative
scale where 0 stands for ‘null’ and 5 for ‘very high’. Finally, let Plc
be a set of trust-based belief change policies.
Let us stress that DL-BT should be conceived as a “family” of
logics rather than a single logic, each of which is parameterized by
a certain set of trust-based belief change policies Plc. Hereafter, a
specific member of the DL-BT family indexed by some set Plc, is
denoted DL-BTPlc .
The language L of DL-BT is defined by the following grammar:
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | B
≥α
i ϕ | T
α
i,jϕ | [∗
f
i ϕ]ϕ
where p ranges over Atm , i and j range over Agt , α ranges over
Num\{0}, and f ranges over the set of total functions with domain
Agt and codomain Plc.
The other boolean constructions ⊤, ⊥, ∨, →, ↔ are defined in
the standard way. Let Obj be the set of all boolean combinations of
atoms in Atm .The elements of Obj are called objective formulas.
Ki is the standard S5 epistemic operator [8]: Kiϕ stands for “agent
i knows that ϕ is true”.
 This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non-
Commercial License.
The formula B
≥α
i ϕ has to be read “agent i believes that ϕ is true
with strength at least α”. Similar operators of graded belief have been
studied in the past by [2, 15, 11]. The formula [∗fi ϕ]ψ has to be read
“after agent i has publicly announced that ϕ is true and each agent j
has revised her beliefs according to the trust-based belief change pol-
icy f(j), ψ will be true”. In other words, the dynamic operator [∗fi ϕ]
allows to represent the effect of agent i’s announcement of ϕ: each
agent revises her beliefs according to the trust-based belief change
policy prescribed by the function f . Finally, the formula Tαi,jϕ has
to be read as “agent i trusts agent j’s judgement on formula ϕ with
strength α”. Note that, when i = j, the operator Tαi,j captures a no-
tion of self-trust (or self-confidence).
We will use the following abbreviations in the rest of the paper.
For all i ∈ Agt and for all α ∈ Num \ {0,max} we define:
K̂iϕ =def ¬Ki¬ϕ Biϕ =def B
≥1
i ϕ
B̂iϕ =def ¬Bi¬ϕ Uiϕ =def ¬Biϕ ∧ ¬Bi¬ϕ
B
α
i ϕ =def B
≥α
i ϕ ∧ ¬B
≥(α+1)
i ϕ B
max
i ϕ =def B
≥max
i ϕ
B
0
iϕ =def ¬Biϕ Ti,jϕ =def
∨
α∈Num\{0}
T
α
i,jϕ
K̂i is the dual of Ki and K̂iϕ has to be read “ϕ is compatible with
agent i’s knowledge”.
The operator Bi captures the concept of belief and Biϕ has to
be read “agent i believes that ϕ is true”. Indeed, we assume that
“believing that ϕ is true” is the same as “believing that ϕ is true
with strength at least 1”.
B̂i is the dual of Bi and B̂iϕ has to be read “ϕ is compatible
with agent i’s beliefs”. The operator Ui captures the concept of un-
certainty or doubt, and Uiϕ has to be read “agent i is uncertain
whether ϕ is true”. The operator Bαi captures the exact degree of
belief. Specifically, Bαi ϕ has to be read “agent i believes that ϕ is
true with strength equal to α”. The special case Bmaxi ϕ needs to be
defined independently since Bmax+1i ϕ is not a well-formed formula.
The abbreviation B0iϕ has to be read “agent i believes that ϕ with
strength 0” which is the same thing as saying that agent i does not
believe ϕ. Finally, Ti,jϕ has to be read “agent i trusts agent j’s judg-
ment on ϕ”.
We call L-BT the static fragment of DL-BT, that is, DL-BT formu-
las with no dynamic operators [∗fi ϕ]. The language L-BT is defined
as follows (as previously, p ranges over Atm , i and j range over Agt
and α ranges over Num\{0}):
ϕ ::= p | ¬ϕ | ϕ ∧ ϕ | Kiϕ | B
≥α
i ϕ | T
α
i,jϕ
2.2 Semantics for the static fragment
Let us first focus on the semantics of the static L-BT formulas. Se-
mantics is defined in terms of possible worlds with a special function
for ranking worlds according to their plausibility degrees, and a fam-
ily of neighbourhood functions for trust.
Definition 1 (Model). A model is a tuple M =
(W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) where:
• W is a nonempty set of possible worlds or states;
• every Ei is an equivalence relation on W with Ei(w) = {v ∈W :
wEiv} for all w ∈W ;
• κ : W × Agt → Num is a total function mapping each world
and each agent to a natural number in Num such that:
(Constr1) for every w ∈ W and for every i ∈ Agt , there is
v ∈W such that wEiv and κ(v, i) = 0;
• Ni,j : W × Num\{0} −→ 2
2W is a total function such that
for all w ∈ W , for all i, j ∈ Agt , for all X ⊆ W and for all
α, β ∈ Num\{0}:
(Constr2) if X ∈ Ni,j(w,α) and α *= β then X *∈ Ni,j(w, β);
(Constr3) if X ∈ Ni,j(w,α) then X ∈ Ni,j(v, α) for all v ∈
Ei(w);
(Constr4) if X ∈ Ni,j(w,α) then X ∩ Ei(w) *= ∅;
• V : W −→ 2Atm is a valuation function for propositional atoms.
As usual, p ∈ V(w) means that proposition p is true at world
w. The set Ei(w) is agent i’s information set at world w: the set of
worlds that agent i envisages at world w. As Ei is an equivalence
relation, if wEiv then agent i has the same information set at w and
v (i.e., agent i has the same knowledge at w and v).
The function κ provides a plausibility grading of the possible
worlds for each agent i. κ(w, i) = α means that, according to agent
i the world w has a degree of exceptionality α or, alternatively, ac-
cording to agent i the world w has a degree of plausibility max− α.
Indeed, following [14], we assume that the degree of plausibility of
a world for an agent is the opposite of its exceptionality degree.
(Constr1) is a normality constraint for the plausibility grading
which ensures that an agent can always envisage a world with a min-
imal degree of exceptionality 0. This constraint is important because
it ensures that an agent’s beliefs are consistent, e.g., an agent cannot
believe ϕ and ¬ϕ at the same time (see below for more details).
The neighbourhood function Ni,j specifies a trust grading of the
subset of possible worlds and is used to interpret the graded trust for-
mulas Tαi,jϕ. Since each set of possible worldsX ⊆W is the seman-
tic counterpart of a L-BT formula, the meaning ofX ∈ Ni,j(w,α) is
that, at world w, agent i trusts agent j’s judgment on the truth of the
formula corresponding to X with strength α. (Constr2)-(Constr4)
are natural constraints for trust. Specifically, (Constr2) requires that
an agent cannot trust the same agent on the same formula with differ-
ent strengths. (Constr3) corresponds to a property of positive intro-
spection for trust, i.e., an agent knows how much she trusts someone.
It is worth noting (Constr3) and the fact that Ei is an equivalence re-
lation together imply that if X /∈ Ni,j(w,α) then X /∈ Ni,j(v, α)
for all v ∈ Ei(w). The latter corresponds to negative introspection
for trust, i.e., if an agent does not trust someone then she knows this.
(Constr4) claims that an agent’s trust in someone must be compati-
ble with her knowledge. Specifically, if agent i trusts agent j’s judge-
ment on the truth of some formula, then there should be some world
that i envisages in which this formula is true.
We use a neighbourhood semantics for interpreting the graded
trust operators Tαi,j because these modal operators are not normal.
We want to allow situations in which, at the same time, agent i trusts
agent j’s judgement about ϕ with strength α and i trusts agent j’s
judgement about ¬ϕ with strength α, without inferring that i trusts
agent j’s judgement about ⊥ with strength α, that is, we want for-
mula Tαi,jϕ ∧ T
α
i,j¬ϕ ∧ ¬T
α
i,j⊥ to be satisfiable. For example, Bill
may trust Mary’s judgement about the fact that a certain stock will
go upward with strength α (i.e., TαBill,MarystockUp) and, at the same
time, trust Mary’s judgement about the fact that the stock will not go
upward with strength α (i.e., TαBill,Mary¬stockUp), without trusting
Mary’s judgement about ⊥ with strength α (i.e., ¬TαBill,Mary⊥).
4
4 Note that Constraint (Constr4) in Definition 1 makes formula ¬Tαi,j⊥
valid for every trust value α. Thus, if Tαi,j was a normal modal opera-
tor, ¬(Tαi,jϕ ∧ T
α
i,j¬ϕ) would have been valid, which is highly counter-
intuitive.
Before providing truth conditions of L-BT formulas, we fol-
low [14] and lift the exceptionality of a possible world to the ex-
ceptionality of a formula viewed as a set of worlds.
Definition 2 (Exceptionality of a formula). Let M =
(W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) be a model. Moreover, let
‖ϕ‖w,i = {v ∈ W : v ∈ Ei(w) and M, v |= ϕ} be the set of
worlds envisaged by agent i at w in which ϕ is true. The exceptional-
ity degree of formula ϕ for agent i at world w, denoted by κw,i(ϕ),
is defined as follows:
κw,i(ϕ) =
{
minv∈‖ϕ‖w,i κ(v, i) if ‖ϕ‖w,i *= ∅
max if ‖ϕ‖w,i = ∅
The exceptionality degree of a formula ϕ captures the extent to
which ϕ is considered to be exceptional by the agent. The value
κw,i(¬ϕ) corresponds to the degree of necessity of ϕ according to
agent i at w, in the sense of possibility theory [7]. The following
definition provides truth conditions for L-BT formulas.
Definition 3 (Truth conditions). Let M =
(W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) be a model and let w ∈ W .
Then:
M,w |= p iff p ∈ V(w)
M,w |= ¬ϕ iff M,w *|= ϕ
M,w |= ϕ ∧ ψ iff M,w |= ϕ and M,w |= ψ
M,w |= Kiϕ iff ∀v ∈ Ei(w) : M, v |= ϕ
M,w |= B≥αi ϕ iff κw,i(¬ϕ) ≥ α
M,w |= Tαi,jϕ iff ‖ϕ‖M ∈ Ni,j(w,α) with
‖ϕ‖M = {v ∈W : M, v |= ϕ}
In the following, we say that the L-BT formula ϕ is valid, de-
noted by |= ϕ, if for every model M and for every world w in M
we have M,w |= ϕ. Moreover, we say that ϕ is satisfiable if ¬ϕ is
not valid. The following validity highlights that beliefs are necessar-
ily consistent: |= ¬(Biϕ ∧ Bi¬ϕ). In the next section, we provide
truth conditions for DL-BT formulas [∗fi ϕ]ψ, after introducing the
concept of trust-based belief change policy.
2.3 Trust-based belief change policies
A trust-based belief change policy specifies the way an agent’s plau-
sibility ranking of possible worlds should be modified depending on
the agent’s trust in the information source.
2.3.1 Additive policy
We start by considering an additive trust-based belief change policy
and denote it by the symbol add . It is inspired by Darwiche & Pearl’s
well-known iterated belief revision method [6].
Definition 4 (Additive policy). Let M =
(W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) be a model and let f
be a function with domain Agt and codomain Plc such
that f(j) = add . Then, for all w ∈ W , we define:
κ∗
f
i
ϕ(w, j) =

Case 1. κ(w, j)
if M,w |= ¬Tj,iϕ
Case 2. κ(w, j)− κw,j(ϕ)
if M,w |= ϕ ∧ Tj,iϕ
Case 3. Cut(α+ κ(w, j))
if M,w |= ¬ϕ ∧ Tαj,iϕ
where:
Cut(x) =

x if 0 ≤ x ≤ max
max if x > max
0 if x < 0
Suppose that the information source i publicly announces that ϕ is
true. Then, according to Definition 4, the additive rule rigidly boosts
the ¬ϕ-worlds up from where they currently are by the degree of
trust agent j has in the information source i. We show below that this
policy guarantees that information received by different information
sources is cumulated, in the sense that agent j ‘does not forget’ her
previous degree of belief about ϕ.
Note that Case 3 is well-defined because of Constraint (Constr2),
agent j cannot trust agent i with different strengths. Function Cut
is a minor technical device, taken from [2], which ensures that the
new plausibility assignment fits into the finite set of natural num-
bers Num . Moreover, note that the situation in which agent j knows
that ϕ is false is a special case of the preceding Case 1. Indeed, be-
cause of (Constr4) in Definition 1, formula Kj¬ϕ → ¬Tj,iϕ is
valid. Consequently, if i’s announcement of ϕ is incompatible with
j’s knowledge, then i’s announcement of ϕ does not have any effect
on j’s beliefs.
We are in position to give the truth condition of the dynamic oper-
ator [∗fi ϕ] for the logic DL-BT
{add}.
Definition 5 (Truth conditions (cont.)). Let Plc = {add}, let M =
(W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) be a model and w ∈W . Then:
M,w |= [∗fi ϕ]ψ iff M
∗
f
i
ϕ, w |= ψ
where M∗
f
i
ϕ = (W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ
∗
f
i
ϕ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) and func-
tion κ∗
f
i
ϕ is defined according to the preceding Definition 4.
We generalize the notions of validity and satisfiability for DL-
BT{add} formulas from the the notions of validity and satisfiability
for L-BT formulas in the obvious way.
2.3.2 Properties of the additive policy
The next proposition highlights that the additive policy defined above
is syntax independent, in the sense that two public announcements
with logically equivalent formulas produce the same effects. This is
a consequence of the fact that the graded trust operator Tαi,j is closed
under logical equivalence.
Proposition 1. If f(j) = add for all j ∈ Agt and |= ϕ1 ↔ ϕ2
then:
|= [∗fi ϕ1]ψ ↔ [∗
f
i ϕ2]ψ (1)
The following proposition captures two fundamental properties of
the additive policy.
Proposition 2. For all i, j ∈ Agt and for all α ∈ Num \ {0}, if
f(j) = add and ψ ∈ Obj then:
|= (Bαj ψ ∧ ¬Tj,iϕ)→ [∗
f
i ϕ]B
α
j ψ (2)
|= Tj,iψ → [∗
f
i ψ]Bjψ (3)
According to validity (2), if an agent does not trust the informa-
tion source then her beliefs about objective facts are not affected by
what the information source announces. The validity (3) is a weak-
ening of the AGM success postulate: agent j will revise her beliefs
with the objective formula ψ only if j trusts the information source’s
judgment on ψ. Validity (3) can be generalized to a sequence of an-
nouncements of any length n.
Proposition 3. For all j, i1, . . . , in ∈ Agt and for all n ∈ N, if
f(j) = add and ψn ∈ Obj then:
|= Tj,inψn → [∗
f1
i1
ψ1] . . . [∗
fn
in
ψn]Bjψn (4)
Let us consider the special case of the preceding validity with n =
2 and ψ ∈ Obj . We have:
|= Tj,i2ψ → [∗
f1
i1
¬ψ][∗fni2 ψ]Bjψ. (5)
This means that, in the case of the additive policy, if two sources
provide contradictory information, then the receiver will give priority
to the last information source, if she trusts her. Let us now illustrate
the cumulative effect of the additive policy.
Proposition 4. For all i, j ∈ Agt and for all α, β ∈ Num \ {0}, if
f(j) = add and ϕ ∈ Obj then:
|=(Tαj,iϕ ∧ B
β
j ϕ)→ [∗
f
i ϕ]B
Cut(α+β)
j ϕ (6)
|=(Tαj,iϕ ∧ ¬Bjϕ)→ [∗
f
i ϕ]B
α
j ϕ (7)
Validity (6) highlights that the additive policy takes into account
not only agent j’s trust in the source, but also what agent j believed
before the source’s announcement. In particular, if agent j trusts i’s
judgment on the objective formula ϕ with degree α and believes ϕ
with strength β then, after i’s announcement of ϕ, j will believe ϕ
with strength Cut(α + β). Validity (7) captures the complementary
case in which agent j does not believe ϕ before the announcement.
In this case, the strength of j’s belief about ϕ is only determined by
j’s trust in the information source i.
The two validities of Proposition 4 can actually be generalized to
a sequence of announcements of any length n as it is highlighted by
Proposition 5. In particular, (i) if ϕ is an objective formula and j
believes ϕ with a certain degree α, then j’s degree of belief about ϕ
at the end of a sequence of n announcements of ϕ is equal to the sum
of α and j’s degrees of trust in the sources of the announcements;
(i) if ϕ is an objective formula and j does not believe ϕ, then j’s
degree of belief about ϕ at the end of a sequence of n announcements
of ϕ is equal to the sum of j’s degrees of trust in the sources of
the announcements. More generally, the additive policy cumulates
information about objective facts coming from different sources.
Proposition 5. For all j, i1, . . . , in ∈ Agt , for all α1 . . . , αn, γ ∈
Num \ {0} and for all n ∈ N, if f1(j) = . . . = fn(j) = add and
ϕ ∈ Obj then:
|=(Tα1j,i1ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ T
αn
j,in
ϕ ∧ Bγjϕ)→
[∗f1i1 ϕ] . . . [∗
fn
in
ϕ]B
Cut(α1+...+αn+γ)
i ϕ (8)
|=(Tα1j,i1ϕ ∧ . . . ∧ T
αn
j,in
ϕ ∧ ¬Bjϕ)→
[∗f1i1 ϕ] . . . [∗
fn
in
ϕ]B
Cut(α1+...+αn)
i ϕ (9)
In propositions 2–5, we only consider objective formulas as they
do not hold in general. If we drop the restriction to objective formu-
las, the validity (3) in Proposition 2 does not work anymore. To see
this, suppose that ψ is a Moore-like sentence of the form p ∧ ¬Bjp.
Then, the formula Tj,i(p∧¬Bjp)→ [∗
f
i (p∧¬Bjp)]Bj(p∧¬Bjp)
is clearly not valid. In fact, Bj(p∧¬Bjp) is equivalent to ⊥. Similar
observations hold for Propositions 3–5.
Notice that the additive policy satisfies the following commutativ-
ity property.
Proposition 6. For all i1, i2 ∈ Agt , if f(j) = add for all j ∈ Agt
and ϕ ∈ Obj then:
|= [∗fi1ϕ][∗
f
i2
ϕ]ψ ↔ [∗fi2ϕ][∗
f
i1
ϕ]ψ (10)
This means that if all agents adopt the additive policy then the
order of the announcements of an objective formula ϕ performed by
several information sources does not matter.
Example 1. Let us illustrate the additive policy. Assume that
Num = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5} s.t. 0 means ‘null’, 1 means ‘very weak’, 2
means ‘weak’, 3 means ‘fair’, 4 means ‘strong’ and 5 means ‘very
strong’.
Bill has to decide whether he buys a certain stock. He hesitates
because he is uncertain whether the stock will go upward (stockUp).
Assume the following initial epistemic state for Bill:
Hyp1 =def UBillstockUp
Bill asks two stockbrokers their opinions: Mary and Jack. He first
asks Mary. Then, he asks Jack. Both Mary and Jack say that the stock
will go upward and that it is convenient to buy it. We assume that
Bill trusts fairly Mary’s judgement on stockUp, and Bill trusts very
weakly Jack’s judgement on stockUp:
Hyp2 =def T
3
Bill,MarystockUp ∧ T
1
Bill,Jack stockUp
Suppose Bill uses the additive policy. In this situation, after having
received the information from Mary and Jack, Bill will strongly be-
lieve that proposition stockUp is true. As Proposition 5 above high-
lighs, Bill cumulates the information provided by the two information
sources. Specifically, if f(Bill) = f ′(Bill) = add then:
|=(Hyp1 ∧Hyp2 )→
[∗fMarystockUp][∗
f ′
Jack stockUp]B
4
BillstockUp.
Now, suppose that Mary and Jack provide contradictory informa-
tion about proposition stockUp. As highlighted by Proposition 3,
priority will be given to the last information source. That is, if
f(Bill) = f ′(Bill) = add then:
|=(Hyp1 ∧ Hyp2 )→
[∗fMary¬stockUp][∗
f ′
Jack stockUp]BBillstockUp.
In the next section we present a new policy, the compensatory pol-
icy that does not satisfy the general property given in Proposition 3.
In case of two contradictory information provided by two sources,
the compensatory policy balances them depending on the degrees of
trust in the sources.
2.3.3 Compensatory policy
The compensatory policy, denoted by the symbol comp, is defined
as follows.
Definition 6 (Compensatory policy). Let M =
(W, {Ei}i∈Agt , κ, {Ni,j}i,j∈Agt ,V) be a model and let f
be a function with domain Agt and codomain Plc such
that f(j) = comp. Then, for all w ∈ W , we define:
κ∗
f
i
ϕ(w, j) =

Case 1. κ(w, j)
if M,w |= ¬Tj,iϕ
Case 2. Cut(κ(w, j)− α)
if M,w |= ϕ ∧ Tαj,iϕ
Case 3. Cut(α+ κ(w, j))
if M,w |= ¬ϕ ∧ Tαj,iϕ ∧ B̂jϕ
Case 4. κ(w, j)
if M,w |= ¬ϕ ∧ Tj,iϕ ∧ Bj¬ϕ
where Cut(x) is the same as in Definition 4.
Let us focus on Cases 2, 3 and 4, as Case 1 is the same as the
one in Definition 4. Case 2 states that, if j trusts i’s judgment on ϕ
then, after i’s announcement of ϕ, the exceptionality degree of a ϕ-
world for j should be decreased depending on how much j trusts i,
in order to decrease the strength of j’s belief about ¬ϕ. Cases 3 and
4 distinguish the situation in which ϕ is compatible with j’s beliefs
from the situation in which it is not. For Case 3, the exceptionality
degree of a ¬ϕ-world for j should be increased in order to increase
the strength of j’s belief about ϕ. For Case 4, agent j should not
change her plausibility ordering in order to preserve consistency of
beliefs. Case 4 guarantees that (Constr1) in Definition 1 is preserved.
The truth condition of the dynamic operator [∗fi ψ] as well as the
notion of validity for the logic DL-BT{add,comp} are defined in a
similar way from the ones for the logic DL-BT{add} given above.
It is important to remark that the compensatory policy as well as
the additive policy guarantee that the updated model M∗
f
i
ϕ is indeed
a model in the sense of Definition 1. In particular:
Proposition 7. If M is a model in the sense of Definition 1 and
f(j) ∈ {add , comp} for all j ∈ Agt , then M∗
f
i
ϕ is a model in the
sense of Definition 1 too.
2.3.4 Properties of the compensatory policy
Let us consider some basic properties of the compensatory policy.
The first point to remark is that, different from the additive policy, the
compensatory policy does not satisfy the weakening of the success
postulate of Proposition 2. That is, if f(j) = comp and ψ ∈ Obj ,
the formula Tj,iψ → [∗
f
i ψ]Bjψ is not valid.
The following Proposition 8 provides a list of validities for the
compensatory policy.
Proposition 8. For all i, j, i1, i2 ∈ Agt , for all α, α1, α2, β ∈
Num \ {0}, if f(j) = f ′(j) = comp and ϕ ∈ Obj then:
|=(Tαj,iϕ ∧ B
β
j ϕ)→ [∗
f
i ϕ]B
Cut(α+β)
j ϕ (11)
|=(Tαj,iϕ ∧ Ujϕ)→ [∗
f
i ϕ]B
α
j ϕ (12)
|=(Tαj,i¬ϕ ∧ B
β
j ϕ)→ [∗
f
i ¬ϕ]B
Cut(β−α)
j ϕ (13)
|=(Tα1j,i1ϕ ∧ T
α2
j,i2
¬ϕ ∧ Bβj ϕ)→
[∗fi1ϕ][∗
f ′
i2
¬ϕ]BCut(Cut(β+α1)−α2)j ϕ (14)
|=(Tα1j,i1ϕ ∧ T
α2
j,i2
¬ϕ ∧ Ujϕ)→
[∗fi1ϕ][∗
f ′
i2
¬ϕ]BCut(α1−α2)j ϕ (15)
According to the validities (11) and (12), if i announces the ob-
jective formula ϕ, ϕ is consistent with j’s beliefs and j adopts the
compensatory policy, then j will increase the strength of her belief
about ϕ w.r.t. her trust’s degree in i. The two validities distinguish
the situation whether j believes ϕ, or whether j is uncertain about ϕ.
The last three key validities (13)–(15) characterize the compensatory
aspect. According to the validity (13), if ϕ is an objective formula
then, after i announces that ϕ is false, j will decrease the strength of
her belief about ϕ depending on how much she trusts i. The validi-
ties (14) and (15) considers information about objective facts coming
from two different sources. Suppose that i1 says ϕ, while i2 says ¬ϕ.
Then, j should compensate the information received from i1 by de-
creasing the strength of her belief about ϕ depending on how much
she trusts i2. Let us illustrate this by revisiting our previous example.
Example 2. Let us suppose that Mary and Jack provide contra-
dictory information about proposition stockUp. Suppose Bill trusts
Mary’s judgment on stockUp with degree 3 and trusts Jack’s judg-
ment on ¬stockUp with degree 1:
Hyp2 ′ =def T
3
Bill,MarystockUp ∧ T
1
Bill,Jack¬stockUp
Now, assume Mary announces that stockUp is true and Jack an-
nounces that stockUp is false. If Bill adopts the compensatory policy,
he will then believe that stockUp is true with strength 3 − 1 = 2.
That is, if f(Bill), f ′(Bill) = {comp} :
|=(Hyp1 ∧ Hyp2 ′)→
[∗fMarystockUp][∗
f ′
Jack¬stockUp]B
2
BillstockUp.
3 Axiomatization
In this section, we provide a complete axiomatization for the variant
of DL-BT where Plc = {add , comp}, namely DL-BT{add,comp}.
This logic has so-called reduction axioms which allow to reduce ev-
ery formula to an equivalent L-BT formula without dynamic oper-
ators [∗fjψ]. That elimination together with the rule of replacement
of equivalent axioms and rules of inference for the static logic L-BT
provides an axiomatization.
Proposition 9 provides reduction axioms for boolean formulas, as
well as the knowledge and graded trust operators.
Proposition 9. The following equivalences are valid:
[∗fjϕ]p ↔ p
[∗fjϕ]¬ψ ↔ ¬[∗
f
jϕ]ψ
[∗fjϕ](ψ1 ∧ ψ2) ↔ ([∗
f
jϕ]ψ1 ∧ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ2)
[∗fjϕ]Kiψ ↔ Ki[∗
f
jϕ]ψ
[∗fjϕ]T
α
i,kψ ↔ T
α
i,k[∗
f
jϕ]ψ
The following abbreviation is useful to formulate the reduction
axioms for the graded belief operators. For all α > max we give the
following abbreviation:
B
≥α
i ϕ =def Kiϕ.
Proposition 10 provides the reduction axiom for the graded belief
operators based on the additive policy.
Proposition 10. Let f(i) = add and α ∈ Num \ {0}. Then, the
following equivalence is valid:
[∗fjϕ]B
≥α
i ψ ↔
(
(¬Ti,jϕ→ B
≥α
i [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)∧∧
β∈Num\{0},γ1∈Num
(
(Tβi,jϕ ∧ B
γ1
i ¬ϕ)→
(B≥α+γ1i (ϕ→ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)∧
B
≥Cut(α−β)
i (¬ϕ→ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ))
))
Proposition 11 provides the reduction axiom for the graded belief
operators based on the compensatory policy.
Proposition 11. Let f(i) = comp and α ∈ Num \ {0}. Then, the
following equivalence is valid:
[∗fjϕ]B
≥α
i ψ ↔
(
(¬Ti,jϕ→ B
≥α
i [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)∧∧
β∈Num\{0}
(
((Tβi,jϕ ∧ B̂iϕ)→
(B≥α+βi (ϕ→ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)∧
B
≥Cut(α−β)
i (¬ϕ→ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)))∧
((Tβi,jϕ ∧ Bi¬ϕ)→
(B≥α+βi (ϕ→ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)∧
B
≥α
i (¬ϕ→ [∗
f
jϕ]ψ)))
))
These two propositions translate the different cases considered in
Definitions 4 and 6. For instance, line 1 of Prop.10 describes Case 1
of Def. 4 (no change if no trust) while lines 2–4 correspond to the
two options for changing when trust holds (Cases 2 and 3 of Def. 4).
As the rule of replacement of equivalences ψ1↔ψ2
ϕ↔ϕ[ψ1/ψ2]
preserves
validity, the equivalences of Propositions 9, 10 and 11 together with
this allow to reduce every DL-BT{add,comp} formula to an equiva-
lent L-BT formula. Call τ the mapping which iteratively applies the
above equivalences from the left to the right, starting from one of
the innermost modal operators. τ pushes the dynamic operators in-
side the formula, and finally eliminates them when facing an atomic
formula.
Proposition 12. Let ϕ be a DL-BT{add,comp} formula. Then: (i)
τ(ϕ) has no dynamic operators [∗fjψ], and (ii) τ(ϕ)↔ ϕ is valid.
The axiomatic system of the logic DL-BT{add,comp} consists of
the axioms and rules of inference in Figure 1. Notice that the rule
of necessitation for graded belief (i.e., from ϕ infer B≥αi ϕ) does not
need to be added, as it is deducible from the rule of necessitation for
knowledge, the fifth axiom for graded belief and modus ponens.
(1) Axioms for L-BT :
– all tautologies of classical propositional logic
– axioms K, T, 4 and 5 for knowledge
∗ Ki(ϕ→ ψ)→ (Kiϕ→ Kiψ)
∗ Kiϕ→ ϕ
∗ Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ
∗ ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ
– axioms for graded belief
∗ B
≥α
i (ϕ→ ψ)→ (B
≥α
i ϕ→ B
≥α
i ψ)
∗ ¬(B≥1i ϕ ∧ B
≥1
i ¬ϕ)
∗ B
≥α
i ϕ→ KiB
≥α
i ϕ
∗ ¬B
≥α
i ϕ→ Ki¬B
≥α
i ϕ
∗ Kiϕ→ B
≥α
i ϕ
∗ B
≥α+1
i ϕ→ B
≥α
i ϕ
– axioms for graded trust
∗ Tαi,jϕ→ ¬T
β
i,jϕ if α $= β
∗ Tαi,jϕ→ KiT
α
i,jϕ
∗ Tαi,jϕ→ K̂iϕ
(2) Rules of inference for L-BT:
– from ϕ and ϕ→ ψ infer ψ
– from ϕ infer Kiϕ
– from ϕ↔ ψ infer Tαi,jϕ↔ T
α
i,jψ
(3) Further axioms and rules of inference for DL-BT:
– from ψ1 ↔ ψ2 infer ϕ↔ ϕ[ψ1/ψ2]
– reduction axioms of Propositions 9, 10 and 11
Figure 1. Axiomatization of DL-BT{add,comp}
Theorem 1. The logic DL-BT{add,comp} is completely axiomatized
by the principles given in Figure 1.
(Sketch). Thanks to Prop. 12 and the fact that DL-BT{add,comp} is
a conservative extension of L-BT, we only need to prove that L-BT
is completely axiomatized by the group of axioms (1) and the group
of rules of inference (2) in Figure 1. The proof consists of two steps.
First, we provide a relational semantics for L-BT and prove that this
semantics is equivalent to the L-BT semantics of Def. 1. Then, we
use the canonical model construction in order to show that the group
of axioms (1) and the group of rules of inference (2) in Fig. 1 provide
a complete axiomatics for L-BT with respect to this semantics.
4 Conclusion
We have proposed a dynamic logic of graded belief and trust that
supports reasoning about trust-based belief change. We have consid-
ered two kinds of trust-based belief change policy and studied their
logical properties in detail. In addition, we have provided a sound
and complete axiomatization for our logic.
Following the belief revision tradition, in future work we plan to
extend the present work with an axiomatic analysis of the additive
and compensatory policies. More concretely, for every policy, we in-
tend to come up with a list of postulates that fully characterize it.
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